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Abstract: In Senegal, we encountered a situation in which a minority group of migrant 
fishermen turned out to have completely different sets of expectations regarding a collective 
action depending on the location where they operated. In one village, expectations were 
pessimistic while in the other village they were optimistic. Understanding this contrast and its 
implications provides the main justification for the paper. To be able to account for the 
contrast between the two areas, pessimistic expectations in the first area have to be traced 
back to a preceding conflict that could never be settled satisfactorily. A perverse path-
dependent process had thus been set in motion that could not be changed by a simple act of 
will of a determined leadership.  To demonstrate the links between expectations and actions 
that fit with the story told, we propose a simple model of collective action with asymmetric 
information. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Ethnic conflict is a generic term that encompasses violent outbursts 
between groups with different identities, whether the source of differentiation 
lies in religion, race, language, culture or regional affiliation.  Recently, there 
have been some attempts to use rational choice theory and, in particular, the 
game-theoretical approach of economics to highlight some aspects of ethnic 
conflicts.  One privileged way of enriching our understanding on the basis of 
such an approach is to emphasize the role of expectations, considering that 
pessimistic expectations may unleash ethnic violence even though there are no 
objective grounds for conflicts of interest between the contending parties 
(Weingast, 1998; Bates et al., 1998).  Thus, when a group fears victimization by 
another, it may become an aggressor in order to preempt the other group from 
attacking.  The bad outcome is all the more likely to occur if a cynical politician 
is ready to exploit people’s ignorance with the goal of building up his own 
career.  He will then strive to instill negative expectations vis-a-vis others in a 
identifiable segment of the population so as to reinforce their particularistic 
identity feelings and thereby mobilize their votes in political contests. 
Instead of explaining tragic situations of destruction and killing, the 
expectation-driven approach can be used to account for situations where 
collective action fails to take place even though it is badly needed.  In this case, 
members of one group refrain from, say, constructing a public good just because 
they fear that members of the other group will free ride on their efforts.  
Whichever the problem addressed –the production of a public bad or the missing 
production of a public good–, it is important to bear in mind that, as long as 
expectations are exogenous, what is being highlighted is only the mechanism 
that triggers the conflict or the collective action failure.  The fundamentals 
behind the problems cannot be grasped unless we understand the process of 
expectation formation.  
By treating currently pessimistic expectations as the outcome of a 
preceding conflict game, the analysis can be deepened.  However, if this game is 
also expectation-driven and expectations underlying this preceding game are 
exogenous, we need yet another game to explain them and the infinite regression 
problem arises. As a consequence, we do not provide an explanation of the 
origin of the conflict, but only of its persistence. (For a similar point see Basu et 
al., 1987).  Yet, if one of the preceding conflict games is not expectation-driven, 
but represents a real conflict of interests, the regression ends and the ultimate 
cause of the conflict is revealed. 
In Senegal, we encountered the following puzzling situation: two groups 
of fishermen, a minority group of migrant fishermen from Saint-Louis and a 
majority group of native fishermen, did not share the same degree of optimism 
regarding the chances of success of a joint collective action in one area (Kayar), 
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while expectations of the same two groups regarding the same collective action 
were similar in another area (Soumbedioune) where the two groups also 
coexisted.  In this paper, we argue that such a contrast can be accounted for by 
tracing back the pessimistic expectations of migrants in Kayar to a preceding 
conflict game which opposed a fraction of them to native fishermen.  No such 
conflict occured in Soumbedioune. 
The aim of this paper is to tell this story in some detail and to illustrate the 
importance of expectations for interaction between groups with different 
identities.  Section 2 describes the history of conflict and cooperation as it 
unfolded in Kayar during the last decades, providing the essential background of 
the paper.  Two major steps can be distinguished.  First, the original conflict 
opposing two groups of fishermen, native fishermen on the one hand and a 
category of migrant fishermen using a special sort of fishing gear on the other 
hand, is explained and characterized.  Subsequent attempts to resolve it are then 
briefly reviewed.  Second, attention is shifted to the emergence of a rather 
unique opportunity of collective action capable of healing the wounds of the 
previous conflict, namely the formation of a cartel aimed at reducing the market 
power of the local fishmerchants or commission agents. 
In Section 3, we address the question of whether expectations regarding 
the chances of success of the output-limiting scheme put into place by the 
fishermen of Kayar have been influenced by the previous traumatic experience 
of conflict.  On the basis of information obtained from a household survey 
(conducted between April and July 1997), and qualitative insights gained from 
conversations with fishermen, it is argued that the trauma has not been erased.  
The scars that it left behind affected not only the category of migrant fishermen 
most directly concerned but the whole group of migrants operating in Kayar.   
In Section 4, we examine the consequences of these pessimistic 
expectations for the fishermen’s behaviour vis-a-vis the output-limiting scheme.  
Towards this purpose, we present a simple model of collective action. One of 
the players in the game is a third party agency that corresponds to the committee 
which the fishermen of Kayar have put into place to enforce the rules of their 
cartel.  In the game, an assymetry of information exists about the impartiality of 
the committee. The inefficient, non unique equilibrium of such a game is 
consistent with the high incidence of rule violations as perceived by the 
fishermen.  Section 5 concludes the paper. 
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2.  The original conflict and the subsequent opportunity to overcome it 
 
2.1  The original conflict as a Tragedy of the Commons 
 
  In Kayar, an important fishing village located in central Senegal, 
competition for access to in-shore waters has been a constant source of tensions 
between native fishermen and migrant fishermen originating from Saint-Louis in 
the North of the country.  An open conflict actually opposed a category of these 
migrant fishermen who operate bottom-set nets, on the one hand, and indigenous 
fishermen using lines and purse seines, on the other hand.   While bottom-set 
nets are gill nets specially designed to catch fish on the bottom of the sea1, purse 
seines are nets characterized by the use of a purse line at the bottom of the net 
which allows the net to be closed like a purse and to thus retain the fish caught.  
The conflict is akin to a Tragedy of the Commons’ game.  As a matter of fact, in 
the perception of the native fishermen at least, owing to the entry of migrant 
fishermen, returns to additional fishing effort are decreasing in the area suitable 
for bottom-set nets.  There may even exist a point at which marginal 
productivity of fishing effort becomes nil so that a zero-sum game is being 
played.   
The most common reaction of the native group in this sort of situation is 
to try to bar the migrant group from access to the contentious resource area.  In 
this way, the Nash equilibrium that would obtain in the open access situation is 
prevented from getting established and the per capita income of the remaining 
resource users is increased while the degree of inefficiency in the exploitation of 
the resource is reduced.  Of course, the extent of these improvements will 
depend on the ratio of the number of expelled (migrant) fishermen to the number 
of indigenous ones.  Such an outcome was nonetheless made difficult by two 
circumstances.  First, bottom-set net operators from Saint-Louis happen to be 
completely specialized in the use of this gear.  As a result, their livelihood 
entirely depends on the incomes thus earned during the period of their migration 
in Kayar.   
Second, resistance on the part of migrant fishermen was heightened by the 
fact that different conceptions of sea tenure prevail among the two groups.  
Fishermen from Saint-Louis have a long tradition of mobility along the West 
African coast, a result of the fact that the fishing zone of Saint-Louis (Guet 
Ndar) is not sheltered from the strong winds of the Atlantic Ocean and is 
therefore accessible only during a limited part of the year.  As a consequence of 
deep-rooted migration habits, these people tend to consider the sea as an open 
access resource that does not belong to any community in particular.  People 
from Kayar have an almost opposite conception of sea tenure : being originally 
                                                 
1   Gill nets are a type of gear designed to gill, entangle or enmesh the fish.  They may be used 
to catch fish on the surface, in midwater or on the bottom.  In the latter case, they are called 
bottom-set nets. 
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an agricultural community with lands located not far from the sea, they are 
inclined to view the adjacent water space as their own territory, much in the 
same way as they see their agricultural lands. 
It is easy to understand why, in such circumstances, native fishermen of 
Kayar became quite aggressive against bottom-set net operators whereas the 
latter fiercely resisted any attempt at dislodging them from their area of 
operation.  Anger on the part of Kayar natives was all the more acrimonious as 
they could blame migrant fishermen not only for causing a decline in their 
catches, but also for destroying their gears.  The problem is that the active gears 
used by Kayar fishermen are particularly liable to be damaged by the migrants’ 
passive gears (bottom-set nets) since both are put into operation within a rather 
overcrowded area.  In actual fact, active gears risk being entangled into passive 
gears placed on the bottom of the sea and tied to buoys serving as landmarks for 
their owners. 
As could have been predicted, the situation soon degenerated into acts of 
physical violence and several death casualties occurred in the course of the year 
1985.  Public authorities could not remain passive in the face of these tragic 
events that could all too easily lead to even more widespread disorder.  In 
February 1986, therefore, the government of Senegal set up a special 
commission charged with the task of defining and monitoring an exclusive 
fishing zone, marked by buoys, in which bottom-set nets were to be prohibited 
from operating2.   
Unfortunately, conflicts between bottom-set net operators and other 
fishermen remained pervasive as illegal encroachments upon the exclusive zone 
were quite frequent.  In most cases, they were not dealt with by the commission 
partly due to a lack of monitoring equipment3.  In 1990, fishermen’s leaders 
from the two communities decided to take more initiative and, with the support 
of some outstanding public authorities (such as the governors of Saint-Louis and 
Thies, and the General Khalife of the Muslim brotherhood of the Layènes in 
Yoff), they created the Comité de solidarité Kayar-Guet Ndar with a view to 
assuming more responsibilities in the monitoring operations and conflict 
resolution mechanisms.  Results, however, remained quite below the 
expectations generated by this inter-community solidarity movement.  
Apparently, one important reason behind this failure is the fact that operators of 
the technique used by migrants in the highly contentious in-shore area (the 
bottom-set net) were not represented in the conflict-management committee. 
 
                                                 
2  This commission is composed of four members, namely the chief of the local fisheries 
administration, the head of the local gendarmerie squad, and one representative of each 
fishing community (resident and migrant fishermen).   
3  The commission had received a canoe equipped with an outboard engine for surveillance 
operations, yet the boat could not be operated because of a lack of working capital for fuel 
expenses and maintenance of the equipment.   
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2.2  Uniting against the merchants : an unique opportunity to erase the scars of 
the past 
 
In the early nineties, a special opportunity arose of forging solidarity ties 
among all fishermen operating in Kayar and thereby healing the wounds caused 
by the aforementioned conflict of resource access in the in-shore waters.  It was 
an especially worthy opportunity because it involved the fishermen in a 
collective struggle against a common enemy, namely the fishmerchants.  Such a 
struggle was motivated by the former’s determination to encroach upon the 
market power wielded by the latter so as to raise producer prices for the fish 
landed on the beach.  It is in 1992 that, under the impulse of the Comité de 
solidarité Kayar-Guet Ndar, leaders from the community of native fishermen of 
Kayar and from the community of (temporary) migrant fishermen from Saint-
Louis launched a first attempt to limit harvesting efforts with a view to driving 
up the prices negotiated with the fishmerchants (known as mareyeurs in 
Senegal).   
Initially, only one of the three fishing techniques in use in Kayar was 
concerned by the output-limiting scheme, namely purse seine fishing.  Handled 
by big canoes moved by outboard engines, this technique is aimed at catching 
pelagic species destined to be largely sold on local markets (possibly including 
markets in neighbouring countries).4  The decision was that purse seine canoes 
would be allowed to make a single trip per day during the season suitable for 
this type of fishing.  A special committee named comité des sennes tournantes 
(committee for purse seines) was established to ensure proper enforcement of 
the rule.  The scheme has persisted to this date. 
 Two years later (1994), the so-called comité des pêches (committee of the 
fisheries) has been set up by the fishermen of Kayar to replicate the experience 
of purse seines in the case of line fishing (operated from canoes of a smaller 
size) which targets demersal species destined for export markets.  Such a step 
was taken soon after the devaluation of the CFA –the money used throughout 
the West Africa’s monetary zone, then pegged to the French Franc and 
guaranteed by France’s Central Bank– when fishermen started fearing a severe 
contraction of their profit margins owing to a rapid rise of their production costs 
(especially, the costs of fuel and the prices of imported fishing equipments).  
Output prices did not rise significantly either because the species concerned 
were not of an exportable variety or because fish intermediaries succeeded in 
appropriating a large share of the gains from devaluation.   
As a matter of fact, talks with management staff of fish-processing 
factories in Dakar confirmed that commission agents in charge of purchasing 
                                                 
4  Pelagic fishes spend most of their life swimming in the water column and have little contact 
with or dependency on the bottom.  Pelagic fishes are often species that have reached their 
adult stage.  By contrast, demersal fishes live in close relation with the bottom and depend on 
it.   
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raw fish on the landing sites on behalf of export companies did not hesitate to 
collude with the purpose of preventing prices paid to the producer from 
increasing after devaluation.  The system of payment applied by these 
companies actually encouraged trade malpractices since they used to pay a 
predetermined price per unit weight (based on world market prices) to their 
commission agents, leaving them free to appropriate any residual gain obtained 
by underpaying fishermen.  In other words, fishmerchants were able to deprive 
fishermen of the beneficial effects of devaluation.  
  In reaction to such glaring manipulations of market prices by 
fishmerchants, fishermen started to demonstrate, first in Yoff (near Dakar) and 
soon thereafter in Kayar where the protest movement took on the form of a 
strike stretching over three consecutive days during which fishmerchants were 
starved of fish.  Fishermen of Kayar demanded prices five to ten times higher 
than those offered them by the mareyeurs!  Since merchants refused to raise 
their prices substantially after fishermen went back fishing, the latter decided to 
sell the fish themselves to the factories by renting in refrigerated vans and 
transporting the raw produce to Dakar.  This was nevertheless a temporary 
solution soon succeeded by a systematic attempt to limit catches of demersal 
species through the fixing of a maximum number of boxes of fish that a canoe is 
allowed to unload on the beach for disposal.  Most of the time, the number of 
boxes is set at three, yet the comité des pêches can increase or decrease the quota 
depending on prevailing demand and supply conditions.  In actual practice, the 
quota per canoe never falls below two boxes of fish because fishermen consider 
that line fishing cannot be profitable if catches are smaller than this quantity.  
Clearly, such a scheme proved longer-lived than lock-out movements –
which are hard to maintain given the lack of intertemporal markets to smoothen 
temporary disruptions of economic activity– and direct sales of fish to export 
companies –which confront fishermen with considerable costs due to their lack 
of experience and skills in marketing. 
 
 
3. Past trauma, loyalty feelings, and present expectations 
 
3.1  Divergent beliefs about economic effects of effort regulation 
 
To what extent were the expectations regarding effort regulation 
influenced by memories of past traumatic conflict around the use of bottom-set 
nets by migrant fishermen from Saint-Louis?  To be able to answer that 
question, we want to determine whether there is a difference of perception 
between native and migrant fishermen, it being understood that migrant 
fishermen include not only the bottom-set net operators but also the users of 
purse seines and lines.  Bear in mind that effort regulation has not been 
attempted for the technique of bottom-set nets which has been at the forefront of 
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the historical conflict of resource access in the in-shore waters.   By asking 
whether purse seine and line fishermen from Saint-Louis, who have not directly 
suffered from that conflict, have more negative expectations than native 
fishermen about the outcome of output-limiting schemes, we want to know if 
their assessment of the present collective action has been shaped by their 
feelings of sympathetic loyalty toward (allegedly) victimized brethren.    
Since attempts at effort regulation in Kayar were historically motivated by 
the objective of countering the fishmerchants’ market power, fishermen were 
explicitly asked whether they believed that objective had been effectively 
attained, that is, whether catch limitations actually resulted in higher producer 
prices.  Because the answers are very heterogeneous (see infra), they may not 
only reflect the opinion about the objective result of the cartel, but also reveal ex 
ante expectations.  If beliefs about cartel effectiveness were formed solely on 
the basis of the commonly observed variable, producer prices, no significant 
differences should be noticed, except those arising from varying levels of 
understanding of the economic mechanism at work.    
 As things turn out, there is a striking difference between the proportion of 
native fishermen (almost 80 percent) and the proportion of migrant fishermen 
(hardly 44 percent) who professed a belief in the economic impact of the 
attempted output-limiting schemes.  It could, of course, be the case that other 
characteristics correlated with the identity of the respondent are responsible for 
this result.  To control for this possibility, we have estimated an econometric 
logit model in which, besides the identity variable reflecting the migrant or non-
migrant profile of the fishermen, several other plausible determinants of their 
beliefs have been introduced, including fishing gear used and education (since 
education can influence the degree of understanding of the market mechanism).   
The dependent variable, effect, is a dummy variable with value equal to 
one when the fisherman has argued in a convincing manner that the kind of 
effort-limiting scheme at work in Kayar yields positive economic effects in the 
form of increased producer price, and equal to zero otherwise.  As for the 
identity variable, Migrant, it is also a binary variable: it is equal to one when the 
fisherman is a migrant, and to zero when he is a native of Kayar.  The results are 
presented in Table 1.   
Before looking at them, two methodological remarks are in order.  First, 
owing to the restricted size of the sample the confidence intervals yielded by the 
logit estimation procedure are not reliable.  We have therefore opted for 
bootstrapping which consists in drawing with replacement in the original sample 
to get a new sample of the same size, for which the estimation is performed.  By 
doing so a large number of times, an empirical distribution is generated for each 
estimated coefficient (here we chose the 90 percent confidence intervals).  
Confidence intervals may then be constructed without any assumption about 
asymptotic distributions.   Second, our bootstrap procedure takes into account the 
clustered sampling approach followed during our fieldwork, that is, the fact that 
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the sampling procedure has taken place in two successive steps: the purposeful 
selection of the fishing techniques, on the one hand, and the random selection of 
household within each selected technique, on the other hand.  Two-stage, 
clustered sampling has a non-trivial effect on the confidence intervals of the 
estimated coefficients, even though it does not affect the values of these 
coefficients. 
 
Table 1. A logit estimate of the determinants of fishermen’s beliefs in the 
economic effect of effort regulation 
 
Logit estimates                                   Number of obs   =         63 
Log likelihood = -36.056219                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1669 
                         (standard errors adjusted for clustering on tech) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
      effect |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [90% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     migrant |  -1.867322   .5856981    -3.19   0.001     -20.09811 -1.307114   
   education |   .6208494    .457249     1.36   0.175      .1859989  17.66876   
       crew1 |  -2.257239   .1860673   -12.13   0.000     -2.703181 -2.013583   
  purseseine |   1.375369   .8052276     1.71   0.088      .6540626   3.10568 
   exclusive |   -.714173   .6251002    -1.14   0.253     -1.565092  .6931472 
 otherincome |  -1.406493    .306259    -4.59   0.000     -18.53301  -.900291   
    constant |   .9793271   1.080402     0.91   0.365     -1.138221  3.096876 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 As is evident from the results displayed in the table, after allowing for a 
number of other possible influences, migrant fishermen turn out to have a 
significantly more pessimistic assessment of the economic effects of effort 
regulation than native fishermen.  (As explained above, the confidence intervals 
obtained through bootstrapping are used to make a judgment about statistical 
significance).  Therefore, it seems that past traumatic events affecting a fraction 
of the migrant population have actually shaped the expectations of other migrant 
fishermen who feel emotionally close to them.   
An apposite counterfactual is provided by the village of Soumbedioune, 
an important port for small-scale fishermen near Dakar.  There, like in Kayar, 
migrants from Saint-Louis coexist with local fishermen, yet, since ecological 
constraints prevent the use of purse seines and bottom-set nets around Dakar, 
line fishing is the only technique available.  Furthermore, no effort limitation 
scheme has been tried in Soumbedioune even though the prospect of doing so is 
being debated.  Interestingly, the proportion of fishermen anticipating positive 
economic effects from the operation of such a scheme does not significantly 
differ between permanent residents and migrants from Saint-Louis: whereas it 
works out to almost 76 percent for the former, it is almost 70 percent for the 
latter.  These proportions are remarkably close to the proportion of 80 percent 
observed among resident fishermen of Kayar (see Table 2).   
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Table 2: Proportions of fishermen with a positive assessment of effort 
regulation, according to migrant/native status and to geographic location 
 Kayar Soumbedioune 
Native fishermen 80% 76% 
Migrant fishermen from Saint-Louis 44% 70% 
 
This finding appears to confirm the view that something  specific to Kayar 
accounts for the pessimism of migrant fishermen operating from this village.  
Since Soumbedioune did not experience the severe inter-community tensions 
caused by the use of bottom-set nets in disputed waters, such as happened in 
Kayar, local history of conflict and cooperation suggests itself as the key 
determinant of the shape of subsequent expectations about collective action 
outcomes. 
 
3.2  The link between reported beliefs and prior beliefs 
 
It could be objected that, since we have measured expectations after 
several years of operation of effort regulation, we cannot be certain that they 
represent prior beliefs held at the start of the scheme.  Because what we are in 
fact measuring are updated, posterior beliefs, it could be the case that migrants 
from Saint-Louis were optimistic at the starting of the scheme, yet adjusted their 
expectations in a pessimistic direction following repeated observations of rule 
breaking.  However, as Section 4 shows, it is the prior beliefs that matter for the 
outcome of the effort regulating game. Therefore, for our analysis to be 
meaningful, we need to make sure that the group of migrants was pessimistic 
before the game started, not only after the collective action failed.  
There are two reasons why we do not think that this alternative 
interpretation, − according to which migrant fishermen were optimistic at the 
start of the scheme, yet became pessimistic over time as the experiment was 
unwinding −, is valid.  First, if what we observe are posterior beliefs, they must 
have been derived from priors through some process of updating.  What we find, 
however, is that perceptions of rule breaking are essentially similar in both 
categories of fishermen: about the same proportion of people in each category 
believe that rule violations are frequent, and this proportion is actually quite 
high (see below).  This means that the information used for updating by both 
categories of fishermen is the same5.  If the migrant fishermen revised their 
                                                 
5 It is true that the fishing technique used (purse seines or lines) influences fishermen’s 
assessment regarding the extent of rule breaking, and that correlation between technique and 
the category of fishermen could create a spurious effect.  The relationship between technique 
and perceptions of rule breaking reflects the fact that it is much easier to detect rule violations 
when the rule consists of a maximum number of fishing trips per day (a highly visible action) 
than when it is based on a maximum quantity of fish allowed to be landed (it is, indeed, not 
too difficult to conceal part of the landings from sight, especially if fish is discreetly disposed 
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expectations pessimistically following repeated observations of rule breaking, 
the local fishermen must have done it likewise.  Therefore, because the posterior 
beliefs are more pessimistic for migrants than for the local fishermen, it must be 
the case that their prior beliefs were also more pessimistic.  A complementary 
argument is presented in Section 4.3, where we use the link between prior 
beliefs and the outcome of the game to strengthen our inference about priors.  
The second reason to believe in the ex ante pessimism of the migrants is 
the fact that their distrust does not concern the particular case of effort 
regulation only, but also extends to other cases of cooperation with local 
fishermen.  In the course of meetings aimed at discussing new collective actions 
outside the realm of effort regulation, namely mutual sea rescue associations or 
informal savings schemes, one of the authors (Jean-Philippe Platteau) could 
personally observe significant resistance on the part of some migrant fishermen 
against proposals of joint action.  Thus, the discussion could become suddenly 
sour when a fisherman from Saint-Louis interrupted a leader native of Kayar by 
reminding him of the bitter conflict around bottom-set nets and the deep scars it 
left on the migrant community.  The trouble-maker would then be abruptly 
silenced on the ground that this conflict had been definitely settled and that it is 
therefore inopportune to bring back the problem in a public meeting.  What such 
situations reveal is that reconciliation between native and migrant fishermen 
following the tragic events of the year 1985 has been more apparent than real.  
There was still much room for suspicions and pent-up frustrations, especially on 
the part of the migrants who felt marginalized by the strong native elite of Kayar 
village.  It is only in the privacy of their home compounds that they dare give 
full vent to lingering ill-feelings. 
It is not coincidental that, in these emotionally charged circumstances, our 
field survey generated a lot of turmoil among the native leadership of Kayar 
village, turmoil that eventually caused our enumerators to be declared persona 
non grata.  Even the determined intervention of the director of the research 
project (Jean-Philippe Platteau), who was himself a long-standing acquaintance 
of several local leading fishermen, could not reverse the situation.  Revealingly, 
the main accusation brought against the enumerators was that they contributed 
to embitter the relationships between native and migrant fishermen by lending a 
complacent ear to their grievances regarding past events and what was 
considered as unjustified pessimism and mistaken distrust in local collective 
endeavours.  In so doing, they were alleged to help keep alive the memory of 
sinister events that would be better forgotten and, thereby, to undermine the 
efforts made by the Kayar leadership to unite all the operating fishermen in a 
common struggle to improve their livelihood.   
                                                                                                                                                        
of while the boat is still out at sea).  Yet, even after duly controlling for the technique used, 
the above result continues to hold: there is no statistically significant difference in the 
perceptions of rule violations between native and migrant fishermen (for more details, see 
Gaspart and Platteau, 2004). 
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The sin committed by the enumerators thus consisted of having listened to 
the privately expressed opinions of (migrant) fishermen who dared question 
present attempts to limit output in the light of past failures, while local leaders 
were striving to suppress such expressions of discontent, and acting as though 
they did not exist.  This elite’s tactic of strong denial of diverging appraisals 
actually reflects their voluntaristic approach to collective action.  Also revealing 
of such a tactic is the fact that leading fishermen of Kayar (well-to-do fishermen 
owning several purse seines and having at least three wives) tend to be much 
more optimistic than other categories of fishermen when asked to assess the 
incidence of rule violations under the effort-limiting schemes (Gaspart and 
Platteau, 2004). 
Reassurances that the results of the household survey will not be used 
against the local fishermen organizations but, on the contrary, will be put at their 
disposal for improving their mode of operation did not lead anywhere.  The 
workshop that was eventually organized to report and discuss the results (in the 
absence of the enumerators) proved to be a disappointing experience: 
essentially, we were told, things were going well and the output-limiting scheme 
did not require any sort of adjustment.  Fishermen harbouring dissenting views 
are just frustrated individuals eager to resurrect the (traumatic) past by referring 
to the bottom-set net conflict and the failure of local organizations to bring it to 
a satisfactory end.  They are dangerous because they do not hesitate to utter their 
grievances at the risk of destroying the valuable achievements of the fishing 
committees set up towards limiting fish harvests. 
To sum up, the presence of control variables in the regression presented in 
Table 1 enables us to draw the following conclusion: the effect of migrant status 
or identity on the fishermen’s beliefs regarding the economic effect of effort 
regulation is not an artefact caused by an association between migrant status and 
some other factor that directly bears on such beliefs.  The contrast between the 
pessimistic and optimistic expectations held by a same group of migrant 
fishermen in two locations (Kayar and Soumbedioune), exposed to different 
histories provides strong support, amply confirmed by qualitative evidence 
obtained in the course of the fieldwork, in favour of the following hypothesis: 
the pessimistic expectations observed among migrant fishermen in Kayar have 
been shaped in a decisive manner by the legacy of inter-community resentment 
born of a severe conflict affecting a subgroup of these fishermen (the bottom-set 
net operators).  Identity or community feelings ensured that the victimization 
experienced by the subgroup spread throughout the entire group of migrant 
fishermen residing in Kayar. 
 
3.3  Ancillary results 
 
Let us now shortly comment the econometric results pertaining to the 
control variables present in the regression.     
 13
First, fishermen working with purse seines appear to be more convinced 
than other fishermen that effort regulation has the intended impact.  (Purseseine 
is equal to one when the operated technique is a purse seine, and to zero when it 
uses lines or bottom-set nets).  This finding can be ascribed (i) to the 
comparatively easy monitorability of effort regulation in the case of purse 
seines, which are regulated on the basis of fishing trips rather than quantities 
landed (see supra), and (ii) to the presence of all local leaders and initiators of 
the output-limiting schemes among the stratum of purse seine owners.   
Second, compared to asset owners, crew labourers on canoes using purse 
seines are less inclined to believe that output limitation can result in higher 
producer prices6.  (Crew1 is equal to one when the fisherman works as a crew 
labourer with a purse seine, and to zero otherwise, while Crew2 is equal to one 
when the fisherman works as a crew labourer with lines or bottom-set nets, and 
to zero otherwise).  This is probably due to the fact that many such crew are not 
professional but only part-time fishermen with comparatively low fishing skills 
and little acquaintance with the fishing trade.  The variable Crew2 does not 
figure out in the table because it is a perfect predictor: in contrast to what we 
observed for purse seine crew, the highly skilled and full-time labourers 
handling lines or bottom-set nets have all admitted to the economic impact of 
effort regulation7.  The corresponding observations have therefore been removed 
from the sample used for the final estimation and bootstrapping. 
Third, fishermen who have alternative income sources available to them 
are also less persuaded that effort restrictions can yield economic benefits.  (The 
variable Otherincome takes on value one if at least one member of the 
household earns some income from an activity other than fishing proper, and/or 
when the household owns some agricultural land or more than one house from 
which rental incomes can possibly be earned).   
Here, the prediction from economic theory is actually ambiguous.  On 
the one hand, when they can rely on complementary sources of income, 
fishermen are expected to be more supportive of effort regulation because they 
are better able to endure the loss of fishing incomes in the short or medium term 
so as to benefit from higher incomes in the long term.  Yet, on the other hand, 
fishermen with greater alternative income opportunities may pay less attention 
to their fishing incomes and feel less ready to incur sacrifices in order to 
increase them.  This is all the more so if alternative incomes originate in fish 
marketing (usually by the fishermen’s wives), since gains accruing to fishermen 
under the form of increased unit prices must then be weighed against the losses 
                                                 
6   Since the crew is paid according to a predetermined share of the catch proceeds, they ought 
to benefit from any increase in the catch proceeds resulting from output limitation.  Other 
things being equal, there is thus no ground to expect crew labourers to differ from equipment 
owners in their assessment of the economic impact of an output-limiting scheme. 
7  Bear in mind that, if all owners of bottom-set nets are migrant fishermen from Saint-Louis, 
this is not necessarily true of the crew handling those nets. 
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suffered by fishmongers within the household.  The result obtained in Table 1 
suggests that the latter effect actually predominates, not a surprising conclusion 
given the inherently conflicting interests between fish harvesters and fish 
distributors that we have just mentioned. 
Fourth, education appears to affect fishermen’s beliefs regarding the 
impact of effort restriction, and the sign of the coefficient is positive as 
expected.  (The variable Education is set to one when the fisherman has gone 
through at least six years of French or Koranic schooling, and to zero 
otherwise).  Note that alternative definitions of this variable (including 
continuous measurements) do not alter the reported result. 
Finally, involvement in sales-tying debts has no significant influence on 
fishermen’s judgment.  (Exclusive takes unit value when the fisherman is 
involved in sales-tying debts with a particular fishmerchant, and zero value 
otherwise).  It is indeed a common feature of many small-scale fisheries in 
developing countries that productive loans may be given to fishermen on the 
explicit condition that their catches will be disposed of through the lender-
merchant and interest payments will be typically subtracted from the sale 
proceeds, possibly in the form of reduced purchase prices.  In this way, 
merchants try to secure themselves a sufficient supply of raw material to keep 
their business running (see Platteau and Abraham, 1987 ; Platteau and Nugent, 
1992).  The hypothesis according to which the assessment of tied fishermen 
could be influenced by fishmerchants (who are opposed to the effort regulation 
schemes) is therefore not borne out by the facts. 
 
 
4.  Expectations and actions in a cartel game with heterogeneous players 
 
4.1 Low enforcement of the cartel rules 
 
So far, we have only dealt with the influence of past, divisive events on 
expectations regarding present and future collective actions.  There remains the 
task of establishing the link between people’s expectations and actions.  
Unfortunately, data about violations of quotas were not made available to us, 
either because they truly do not exist, as contended by local leaders sitting on 
the executive committees in charge, or because these leaders did not want us to 
see them.  What is striking is the contrast between the optimistic assessments of 
native leaders, on the one hand, and the large incidence of rule breaking as 
reported in our household survey.  As a matter of fact, as many as 38 percent of 
the sample fishermen of Kayar believe that rule violations are frequent8.  Yet, 
leaders belonging to Kayar’s elite were at pains to persuade us that there had 
                                                 
8 Note that we have also asked fishermen whether they have themselves violated the rules, yet 
only 9 out of 127 fishermen in the restricted sample confessed to have done so.  For obvious 
reasons, these answers are unreliable. 
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been only a few cases of clear infringement of the set regulations concerning 
effort restrictions.    That there was no such thing as a diary reporting the known 
cases of rule violation was therefore not thought to be an important shortcoming.  
Severe punishments, they explained to us, had been devised to sanction 
violations of output-limiting rules.  Thus, when a canoe equipped with a purse 
seine is found exceeding the limit of one fishing trip per day, the rule provides 
that a fine of 100,000 CFA is imposed on the owner.  If he refuses to comply, 
the canoe and the net are confiscated till he pays the fine, and they can be 
ultimately sold in case of prolonged default.  However, grace delays to pay the 
fine are extendable to 10-15 days when the rule-breaker is a well-known 
fisherman with solvency problems.  The same system applies to canoes 
equipped with lines : concealment of fish boxes exceeding the allowed quota is 
punished by a fine amounting to 50,000 CFA.   
According to committee members, however, such punishments are rarely 
meted out because there are few rule breakers: for purse seines, only once had a 
fisherman been allegedly threatened with confiscation of his equipment and the 
threat did not have to be executed because the culprit paid the fine on the eve of 
the announced seizure.  An alternative explanation, which is more consistent 
with the above evidence of frequent rule violations, is that enforcement is low.  
And low enforcement suggests that effort regulation has not been very effective 
in the long run, even though we have shown elsewhere that there was a genuine 
potential for price increases through output limitations in Kayar (see Gaspart 
and Platteau, 2002: 93-95, and Appendix B)9.  
In the following, we intend to propose a simple game-theoretical 
framework aimed at identifying possible outcomes in a cartel with 
heterogeneous players.  In particular, we look for a plausible scenario leading 
from pessimistic expectations born of a traumatic experience of inter-
community conflict to collective action failure. 
                                                 
9 Due to difficult logistical problems, we could only obtain from the CRODT (Centre de 
Recherches Océanographique de Dakar-Thiaroye) monthly price and landing data pertaining 
to the years prior to the operation of the effort-limiting schemes.  It was therefore impossible 
to quantitatively assess the impact of these schemes, that is, to determine whether producer 
prices actually increased as a result of effort regulation in Kayar as compared to other fishing 
sites where no regulation occurred.  What we could establish, however, is that inverse demand 
elasticities were significantly different from zero for a number of important fish species prior 
to the launching of the output-limiting scheme in Kayar.  This being said, it is perhaps 
revealing that, in a follow up workshop in the course of which results of this study were 
presented, some fishermen expressed doubts regarding the effectiveness of their output-
limiting efforts.  It is likely, however, that in the beginning of the post-devaluation period 
(1994) fishermen, especially those targeting export species, did benefit from their acting 
together.  As a matter of fact, they brought to the attention of the managers of fish factories in 
Dakar the perverse effect of the remuneration system which they used to pay commission 
agents in charge of purchasing the raw fish (see supra), and this system was consequently 
modified.   
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4.2 Models of effort-limiting schemes with heterogeneous players 
 
The simple theoretical exercise that follows is aimed at understanding the 
process of cartel formation. In the absence of common identity feelings, our 
approach is deliberately focused on the interaction between native and migrant 
fishermen.  For that reason, the following models treat the two groups as players 
and abstract from intra-group considerations. Although the migrant group is 
smaller than the resident group, it is sufficiently numerous to be an important 
partner in the cartel formation. If residents disregard it, their market power may 
fall or even collapse. 
 
Game 1: Unenforced Cartel 
 
We assume that fishermen produce a homogenous good and sell their 
product on a common market with a downward sloping demand curve. The 
decision variable of the fishermen is the quantity.10  In such a setting, if no 
binding commitment is allowed, the only symmetric Nash equilibrium that 
exists involves both groups picking Cournot quantities, henceforth referred to as 
noncooperative strategies (NC).  The payoffs associated with the strategy profile 
(NC, NC) are d > 0 for each player.  This outcome, however, is Pareto 
dominated by the collusive one. It is, indeed, profitable for both groups to 
collude and produce together the monopoly quantity.11  Producing this quantity 
will be identified as the cooperative (C) strategy.  If both groups play C, then, 
they earn a payoff of c > d each.  
As mentioned above, the strategy profile (C, C) is not a Nash equilibrium 
and every party has an incentive to deviate from the effort restraining scheme by 
producing a larger quantity.  This quantity is not only larger than the cartel 
quantity associated with the C strategy, but also larger than the Cournot quantity 
associated with the NC strategy.  Nevertheless, even playing NC is better that 
playing C in this situation. To keep things simple, we assume that the player 
who wants to free ride applies the NC strategy if he expects the other player to 
play C.12  This approach will help us avoid considering continuum strategy 
spaces without losing basic insights into the problem.  The strategy profile (NC, 
C) yields v > c for the free rider and s < d for the (sucker) cooperating player. 
                                                 
10 The assumption of Bertrand competition leads to qualitatively the same game structure as 
the one derived from the assumption of Cournot competition.  
11 The two groups will divide the monopoly quantity between them in proportion to the 
respective size of their physical capital.  
12 Allowing players to choose the best response strategy would increase the gain of the free 
rider by providing him with more incentives to deviate. However, even if only the NC 
strategy is allowed, it destroys the cooperative outcome by supplying incentives to cheat.  
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Clearly, the cartel game played between residents and migrants has the structure 
of the Prisoner Dilemma, where v > c > d > s, as described in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Payoff matrix of an unenforced cartel 
 
  Migrants 
  C NC 
C c , c s , v Residents NC v, s d , d 
 
 
Game 2: Impartially Enforced Cartel 
 
In the above situation where no binding commitment is allowed, each 
group has an incentive to deviate unilaterally from the scheme.  To prevent the 
cartel from breaking down, the Senegalese fishermen devised an enforcement 
mechanism in the form of fishermen committees (one for each fishing technique 
concerned).  The role of a committee is to detect and punish unilateral violations 
of the cartel agreement by imposing fines and, if the fines are not paid, by 
confiscating fishing equipments till the payment is honored.  Since the members 
of the committee are fishermen themselves, it is in their interest to maintain the 
cartel so they are eager to punish the violators.13   
Such motivation on the part of a committee can be represented by a 
simple utility function.  Committee members derive a positive reward α when 
they punish a fisherman who has exceeded the quota.  This reward represents the 
material gain that accrues to them when the cartel is enforced in a marginally 
more effective manner and, possibly, it also includes a psychic benefit arising 
from fulfilling one’s duty as scheme enforcers.  The utility of not punishing a 
violator is normalized to zero.  The amount of fine, denoted by F, does not enter 
into the utility function of the committee members because it is not appropriated 
by them.  If F is large enough to deter fishermen from violation (F > v - c), 
cooperation can be maintained, as is evident from Table 4.14  The game has the 
structure of a coordination game, where there are two Nash equilibria (C, C) and 
(NC, NC), with the former one Pareto-dominating the latter.  The Pareto-
efficient equilibrium is likely to be chosen if some pre-play communication is 
allowed.  
                                                 
13 We abstract here from the issues arising from possible rule violations by members of the 
committee.  Enforcing good behaviour on the part of committee members is supposed to be 
costless. 
14 The committee punishes every violating fisherman, but only as long as the cartel operates. 
The committee does not operate if both sides fail to cooperate and the cartel dissolves (i.e. 
every fisherman is cheating). Because (NC, NC) triggers the dissolution of the cartel, the 
committee ceases to operate. 
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Table 4: Payoff matrix of an impartially enforced cartel 
 
  Migrants 
  C NC 
C c , c s , v-F Residents NC v-F, s d, d 
 
 
Game 3: Asymmetrically Enforced Cartel 
 
The crucial assumption allowing for the optimistic result obtained in 
Game 2 is the existence of an impartial third party enforcement mechanism.  
Yet, this assumption is not satisfied in the peculiar case of Kayar since the two 
committees in charge of enforcing the effort-regulating schemes are dominated 
by fishermen native of Kayar.  They are therefore susceptible to external 
pressure on the part of resident fishermen.  More precisely, a resident caught 
violating the rule can more easily persuade the committee to condone his failing 
than a migrant fisherman could.  This is because of the feeling of group identity 
that binds local residents.  Indeed, if those who dominate the committee have 
strong identity affiliations, they will incur a psychic cost when punishing a 
fellow fisherman native of Kayar.  If this cost, henceforth called identity cost, is 
large enough, the committee becomes biased and stops penalizing the residents, 
punishing only the migrants.  Migrant fishermen cannot influence the committee 
and are always punished, regardless of the strength of the identity feelings 
among the residents.   
This behaviour of committee members is justified by the following 
modification of their utility function (for an introduction to economic modeling 
of group identity, see Akerlof and Kranton, 2000).  Like before, committee 
members derive a positive reward α when they punish a fisherman who has 
exceeded the quota.  In addition, they now incur a psychic identity cost, Ic (with 
Ic > 0), when punishing a permanent resident and no such cost when sanctioning 
a migrant.  Therefore, committee members will always punish migrants (since α 
> 0), yet will sanction residents only if Ic < α, that is, only if their sense of duty 
dominates their feelings of group identity.  If that is the case, the payoff matrix 
is the same as that depicted in Game 2 (see Table 4 above).  When, however, the 
identity cost is so large as to exceed the gain α, the committee is biased in the 
sense that it shows leniency towards native fishermen.  Discrimination against 
migrant fishermen in the meting out of punishments is reflected in the payoff 
matrix presented in Table 5.  The corresponding game has the structure of a one-
sided Prisoner Dilemma in which the non-cooperative outcome is the only Nash 
equilibrium.15  
                                                 
15  We have assumed that α is constant. More realistically, we could make it depend on the 
number of actual violators, in which case this parameter becomes endogenous. The exact 
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Table 5: Payoff matrix of an asymmetrically enforced cartel 
 
  Migrants 
  C NC 
C c , c s , v-F Residents NC v, s d , d 
 
 
Game 4: Incomplete Information and Cartel Enforcement 
 
The next game makes somewhat more realistic assumptions about the 
informational structure of the model. The crucial hypothesis here is that 
residents know the magnitude of the identity cost incurred by committee 
members, but migrants are uninformed about it. This hypothesis is justified by 
the fact that resident fishermen and committee members belong to the same 
social group with the consequence that they are aware of the strength of their 
mutual identity feelings. More precisely, fishermen native of Kayar have better 
knowledge than migrant fishermen regarding the extent to which committee 
members are susceptible to identity costs and the extent to which they are 
themselves ready to exercise pressure on them.  On the contrary, being members 
of a distinct social group, migrants have only an imperfect idea of the emotions 
and feelings which drive the resident population.  As a result, they only have a 
subjective assessment of the cost for a committee member to sanction a fellow 
fisherman from Kayar.  
In fact, knowledge about the level of identity cost within the committee is 
equivalent to knowledge as to whether the game that is played is Game 2 or 
Game 3.  To capture this idea formally, let {Hi, Lo} be the residents’ type space, 
where Hi corresponds to the case of a high identity cost when Ic > α (Game 3), 
and Lo corresponds to the case of a low identity cost when Ic < α (Game 2).  Our 
hypothesis states that residents know their type with certainty, but migrants 
attach probability π to Lo and 1-π to Hi.  
We will show that there are two possible Bayesian Nash equilibria of this 
game.  First, if the migrants’ strategy is NC, then the best response of the 
residents is also to play NC, regardless of their type.  For the migrants to play 
NC is a best response to this (pooling) strategy of residents, so that the two 
strategies constitute a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, which will be subsequently 
                                                                                                                                                        
shape of the relationship between α and the number of violators cannot be determined as long 
as we do not have information about the nature of the demand curve and strategic reactions of 
other players. Whatever it is, the effect of endogenizing the number of violators is that there 
will be a positive number of them even at the cooperative equilibrium. Since this is the only 
additional insight that we could gain from modifying the assumption of constant α, and since 
such modification would compel us to write a more complex n-person game, we do not depart 
from the initial framework. 
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referred to as the non-cooperative equilibrium.  Second, if migrants’ strategy is 
C, the best response of the residents is to play C if they are Lo and to play NC if 
they are Hi.  Playing C is the best response of migrants to this (separating) 
strategy if and only if it yields a higher expected payoff than playing NC, that is 
when π > π* = (d-s)/[d-s+c-(v-F)].  Hence these two strategies form a Bayesian 
Nash equilibrium only if migrants are optimistic enough to believe that the 
committee will be not biased (π > π*).  This equilibrium will be henceforth 
referred to as the cooperative equilibrium.   
The equilibrium analysis of the model provides an important insight into 
the situation of fishermen in Kayar.  The cooperative outcome is possible only if 
the migrants are optimistic enough (π > π*) to believe in that the committee is 
impartial.  If migrants are pessimistic (π < π*), the only possible outcome is the 
non-cooperative one.  Therefore, the behaviour of migrant fishermen depends 
crucially on their subjective assessment of impartiality of the committee.   
The failure of collective effort regulation in Kayar can be interpreted as 
the outcome of the non-cooperative equilibrium of Game 4.  As Section 3 
shows, migrant fishermen were more pessimistic about the economic effect of 
effort regulation than the fishermen native of Kayar.  Moreover, the pessimism 
of migrant fishermen was caused neither by their different understanding of the 
mechanism of effort regulation, nor by their different economic situation.  After 
controlling for those (and other) effects, the econometric analysis exhibits ethnic 
identity as a significant variable.   
Such a conclusion seems to suggest that the asymmetry of beliefs between 
migrants and residents was caused by an asymmetry of information about the 
impartiality of the committee.  More specifically, because of historically 
motivated distrust towards the native fishermen, the migrants believed that the 
committee was impartial only with very low probability.  This, as our analysis 
shows, allows only for the non-cooperative equilibrium to occur.  What deserves 
to be emphasized is that in the non-cooperative equilibrium the effort limiting 
scheme fails even if the committee is not in fact biased and the objective 
conditions for cooperation exist.   This is what in fact happened in Kayar.  It is 
the migrants’ fear of being cheated that ruined the possibility of cooperation.  
Because they feared non cooperative behaviour on the part of resident 
fishermen, migrants themselves played non cooperatively to preempt the 
expected behaviour of the former.  Even though the objective conditions for 
increasing prices existed, the pessimism of the migrants did not allow for 
cooperation and the effort regulation scheme failed. In their voluntarist attitude 
towards inter-community cooperation, local leaders have underestimated the 
lingering effects of the past ethnic conflict. 
 
4.3  Inferring initial beliefs from reported opinions 
 
Having this game-theoretic framework in mind, we can now return to the 
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discussion of Section 3.2 and provide one more argument for ex-ante pessimism 
of migrants. The inference of ex ante fishermen’s beliefs (beliefs held prior to 
the play of the game) from ex post beliefs such as they have been reported 
during the household survey can be made systematic thanks to the fact that we 
are able to compare reported beliefs for two groups of fishermen.  Let M denote 
migrants, and N  native fishermen.  There also are two possible beliefs: P, for 
pessimistic, and O, for optimistic.  Hence we have four possible combinations of 
beliefs of the two groups prior to the play of the game: 
 
 
Case 1:   M-O, N-O 
Case 2:   M-P, N-P 
Case 3:   M-O, N-P 
Case 4:   M-P, N-O 
 
We did not observe which case happened ex ante but we know that 
reported ex post attitudes were M-P, N-O.  We also know that rule violations are 
frequent. The exercise is to infer the ex ante beliefs from these two pieces of 
information, using the framework of Game 4.  Note that, although we are trying 
to inspect beliefs of both groups of fishermen, only migrants’ beliefs are explicit 
in the framework of the game. Nonetheless, we can successfully rule out some 
cases by applying this logic.   
First, we can rule out Case 1 because the beliefs assumed under this 
scenario should have resulted in a favourable outcome of the game (few rule 
violations).  Moreover, as explained in Section 3.2, if both migrants and native 
fishermen had the same beliefs prior to the game, both would change them as a 
result of ex post rationalization or updating.   
Case 2 is also unlikely. Although it results in the outcome of the game that 
was actually observed (ineffective operation due to low enforcement), it is 
difficult to imagine that permanent residents changed their beliefs from 
pessimistic to optimistic while observing frequent rule violations.  The above 
argument of asymmetry of rationalization also applies here.  
Case 3 is equally dubious, for the same reason that Case 2 is.  It is not 
plausible that, while observing a lot of rule breaking, permanent residents would 
have shifted from a pessimistic to an optimistic attitude.  
Having ruled out all the alternative hypotheses, we are left with Case 4 as 
the only plausible scenario.  In other words, observed ex post beliefs of the two 
categories of fishermen correctly reflect their beliefs held before the effort-
limiting scheme was launched.  Therefore, our interpretation of the results 
presented in Table 1 (see Section 3) is confirmed: from the very beginning, 
migrant fishermen were suspicious about the effort-limiting schemes, an attitude 
influenced by the memory of painful inter-community tensions of which they 
felt to be the victims.  The pessimism on the part of the migrants is reflected in 
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their low expectations about impartiality of the committee: π is small, so it 
deters migrants from cooperation.  This drives native fishermen to also violate 
the prevailing rules, resulting in a low general rate of compliance that 
undermines the effectiveness of effort restriction measures.   
There remains the puzzling question as to why native fishermen of Kayar 
continue to hold positive expectations in spite of the high incidence of rule 
violations of which they are aware.  Our hypothesis here is that the positive 
judgment of native fishermen has been made in the light of the immediate 
beneficial effect of collective organization, namely the ending of the most 
glaring collusive practices of the fishmerchants acting as agents on behalf of 
export companies (see supra, footnote 9).  Yet, it bears emphasis that, if this is 
the correct interpretation, it is not effort regulation per se that produced benefits 
for the fishermen, but a collective struggle aimed at compelling fishmerchants to 
abandon their most blatant trade malpractices under the pressure of a showdown.  
Consequently, awareness of the low enforcement performances of the output-
limiting schemes did not really affect the assessment of the whole collective 
endeavour by native fishermen.   
Interestingly, the optimistic beliefs of the fishermen in Soumbedioune 
turn out to be also based on positive impressions generated by an apparently 
successful collective struggle of fishermen against fishmerchants in Kayar.  The 
very fact that fishermen could resist and confront the power of the fishmerchants 
thanks to their effort to set up an appropriate collective organization seems to 
constitute sufficient evidence to the effect that fishermen’s efforts are effective.  
As for migrant fishermen in Kayar, the tendency is to deny the positive effect of 
the collective struggle while giving more weight to the failure of effort 
regulation proper. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Circumstances specific to a peculiar location can significantly influence 
the prospects of collective action through the shaping of expectations of key 
actors.  In particular, it may be difficult for members of different social groups 
to cooperate if they were opposed on the occasion of a major conflict in the past.  
This is exactly what happened in the village of Kayar where a fraction of 
migrant fishermen using passive gears antagonized native fishermen operating 
in the in-shore waters.  Out of loyalty feelings, other migrant operators strongly 
identified with their brethren from Saint-Louis.  This traumatic experience as it 
was felt by the migrants (the conflict resulted in death casualties) became 
reflected in pessimistic expectations regarding the prospects of collective actions 
undertaken jointly with permanent residents of Kayar. 
Local leaders were still persuaded that acting cooperatively in a 
voluntaristic manner would erase the bad memories of people harbouring 
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dissenting views.  A collective struggle against fishmerchants provided an 
unexpected opportunity to overcome past tensions.  It, indeed, led to the 
launching of effort regulation schemes to be enforced by fishermen’s 
committees.  It is nevertheless apparent that many migrant fishermen did not 
trust the committees, which they believed did not represent them properly.   A 
plausible scenario is that, suspicious of being discriminated, they tended to 
violate the set rules and, being aware of such a lack of trust among migrant 
fishermen, permanent residents adopted the same attitude.  In fact, this is exactly 
the prediction that can be drawn from an appropriately specified coordination 
game in which there is private information about the impartiality of 
enforcement.  
The story told in this paper provides a vivid illustration of the legacy of 
past antagonisms.  A nasty precedent was created that undermined cooperation 
in subsequent games due to the formation of pessimistic expectations.  The other 
central lesson to draw from it is that skill or technical heterogeneity lies at the 
root of present-day inter-community tensions among fishermen operating from 
Kayar.  Combined with the conflictual nature of fishing operations involving the 
use of different techniques in the in-shore waters, the complete absence of native 
fishermen in the group of bottom-set net operators, as well as the entire 
dependence of a fraction of migrant fishermen on this technique, have produced 
a polarized opposition between clearly demarcated groups.  Such a situation is 
particularly explosive because use of a particular technique or possession of a 
particular skill is associated with community identity, which tends to add a 
symbolic and emotional dimension to what could have remained a pure conflict 
of interests. 
To sum up, at the rock-bottom of the conflict lies an economic contest 
around scarce resources.  This contest got amplified because of a technological 
divide that unhappily coincided with a community divide.  In the absence of the 
former, the latter would not have mattered.  In such a context, proper 
constitutional mechanisms must be devised and enforced so as to allay the fears 
of contending social groups and thereby surmount inter-community tensions, as 
emphasized by Horowitz (1985).  This is precisely the condition that was not 
fulfilled in the case of Kayar, in spite of the apparently good intentions of the 
native fishermen and the local elite.  By overestimating the merits of a 
voluntaristic approach, the local elite underplayed the negative effect of past 
trauma and the consequent need for institutional arrangements providing enough 
re-assurances to the victimized group.  Suppressing expressions of lingering 
frustrations and ill-feelings, especially if it is done in a rather brutal manner, is 
probably not a good tactic: it may actually contribute to the persisting influence, 
instead of the eradication, of painful memories and obstructive misgivings. 
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